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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the rules governing the review proper might well be inter-
preted as granting a trial de novo since provision is simply
made that "the order complained of shall be taken as prima
facie valid" and "all pertinent evidence with respect to the
validity and reasonableness of the order of the commissioner
complained of shall be admissible."'1 If the commissioner is to
have primary jurisdiction over "post-order" evidence, it will
evidently take, more than the words of the present statutory
provisions to assure it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Charles A. Reynard*
The past term produced but three cases in the field of con-
stitutional law, two of which dealt with impairment of the
obligation of contract and the third involving the equal pro-
tection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
The contract clause cases, one alleging impairment by a
federal statute, and the other by a state act, were actually
disposed of upon the ground that no impairment in fact oc-
curred. It is the dicta of the cases which are of interest, how-
ever, illustrating as they do that the clause serves as a limita-
tion only upon the legislative powers of the states and not upon
Congress. The state act, challenged in Fireside Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Martin,' was Act 195 of 1948 amending
the Insurance Code,2 which reads in part as follows:
"All life, health and accident insurers on cooperative
assessment plan organized and authorized to do business
in this state as of 12:00 noon of October 1, 1948, may con-
tinue to operate provided, that from and after December
31, 1950, all policies issued by such insurers shall be sub-
ject to and in accordance with the laws and regulations of
this state relative to industrial life insurance, and especially
11. La. R.S. 1950, 30:12. Even in the context of a trial de novo granted
by statute, the United States Supreme Court has, however, indicated scope
for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis' com-
ments in Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285,
291 (1922). And see generally Davis, Administrative Law § 197.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 66 So. 2d 511 (La. 1953).
2. La. R.S. 1950, 22:391.
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subject to the provisions of this Code relative to domestic
industrial insurers, with the same insuring powers which
they have on such date. The operation of such insurers
shall be governed by the provisions of this Part, and by all
the applicable provisions of this Code not in conflict here-
with."
Plaintiff, an insurer doing business on the co-operative or assess-
ment basis and therefore subject to the act, contended that the
enactment impaired the obligations of its charter contract with
the state.3 In his opinion for a unanimous court, Justice Moise
denied the claim on the ground that "there is no impairment
of the obligation of the contract of the company [because] the
measure is a regulation as to the form of policy the company
must write in the future. ' 4 Although this conclusion of "no
impairment" might be debated as a theoretical proposition, such
impairment as in fact occurred is quite clearly permissible under
the state's reserved police power to regulate an activity so
closely related to the public welfare, a facet of the case with
which Justice Moise deals at length elsewhere in his opinion.
It has been the settled jurisprudence of the federal cases since
1880 that the legislature cannot bargain away the police power
of a state,5 despite the language of Article I, Section 10, of the
Federal Constitution providing that "No State shall . . . pass
any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The other decision involving the contract clause, Probst v.
Nobles,6 was a case arising under an act of Congress, the Hous-
ing and Rent Act of 1947.7 The plaintiff-lessor sought to obtain
possession of property which had been leased to the defendant
in 1948 for a term of five years at a stipulated monthly rental
of $175. In 1950 the Housing Expediter of the City of New
Orleans, in the course of administering the federal statute, di-
rected that the rental be reduced to $77.50, 8 and plaintiff then
sought to terminate the lease prior to the expiration of the
five-year term. In support of his claim, the plaintiff asserted
that the action of the federal official caused a termination of
3. There was also a claim that the amendatory provision was void for
irreconcilability with other portions of the Insurance Code which was
rejected.
4. 66 So. 2d 511, 514 (La. 1953).
5. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-818 (1880).
6. 66 So. 2d 609 (La. 1953).
7. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1881 et seq. (1951).
8. The rental was further reduced by the Expediter on April 25, 1952,
to the sum of $61.50.
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the lease by rendering performance of its provisions impossible
as a matter of law, despite the fact that regulations issued under
and pursuant to the federal act contained a specific provision
to the contrary.9 In the alternative, it was contended that if the
lease did not terminate as a matter of law, then the federal
enactment constituted an impairment of the obligation of the
lease contract. The principal contention was rejected because
of the clear and unmistakable language of the regulations
which declared that leases were not to terminate as a result
of action taken under the act. The contract clause contention
was overruled because it was found that no impairment had
in fact occurred, the lease having been entered into subsequent
to the date of the enactment of the statute and, therefore, with
full knowledge of its existence and notice that such action
might be taken. In this view of the case it was unnecessary
for the court to consider which, if any, constitutional provisions
operate as a limitation upon the legislative powers of Congress
in the area of impairment of contract. The contract clause, by
its terms, is limited to state laws and hence is not applicable
to such a case. However, the Supreme Court of the United
States has always recognized a contract clause concept as a
part of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution; and during the heyday of sub-
stantive .due process of law it served to invalidate congressional
enactments aimed at social reform. 10 With the shrivelling of
substantive due process during the era of the Roosevelt-Truman
Court, however, there has been a growing tendency to sustain
legislative enactments of the Congress which represent the
exercise of specifically granted powers despite the fact that they
operate incidentally to restrict liberty of contract. This trend
has been extended to cover contracts to which the government
itself is a party.1 ' The Louisiana court recognized this broad
power of Congress to effect some impairment, for after con-
cluding that no actual impairment resulted in the subject case,
it went on to say: "However, the result would be the same
9. Section 61, Chapter 21, Title 32A, C.F.R.
10. See, e.g., Adair V. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) invalidated
on act of Congress outlawing the use of the so-called "Yellow-dog Contract,"
in employment on interstate railroads.
11. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S., 742 (1948) (sustaining legislation
authorizing the renegotiation of government contracts); Norman v. Balti-
more & 0. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) and Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935) (the famous "gold clause" cases which grew out of legislation
devaluing the dollar).
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if the legislation had been enacted subsequently to the written
lease, for it is well settled that Congress does not run afoul of
any constitutional prohibition if in the valid exercise of its war
powers it incidentally impairs private contracts or obligations. '1 2
The case of Simmons v. City of Shreveport" posed the
issue of equal protection and in the opinion of the writer was
incorrectly decided. In that case the city adopted an ordinance
forbidding the sale of liquor in "neighborhood commercial"
zoning districts with the proviso that all persons who had been
properly licensed to make such sales in these districts one year
prior thereto.14 might continue their nonconforming use subject to
existing licensing regulation. Plaintiff had been lawfully en-
gaged in the retail selling of packaged liquor goods for a period
of less than three months at the time of the adoption of the
ordinance. He was requested by the city to surrender his li-
cense and sued to have the ordinance declared void for denial
of equal protection of the laws. The court sustained his claim,
concluding that the ordinance was "arbitrary, unreasonable,
discriminatory and confiscatory, and . . . denies . . . equal pro-
tection of the laws." Admittedly the ordinance is discrimina-
tory and, as applied here, retrospective as well. However, no
provision of the state or federal constitutions forbids the enact-
ment of retrospective laws in the regulation of civil affairs.
Insofar as equal protection is concerned, discrimination alone
is insufficient to invalidate legislation. Indeed, the very process
of classification-concededly permissible despite the equal pro-
tection clause-contemplates discriminatory action by legisla-
12. 66 So. 2d 609, 610-611 (La. 1953).
13. 221 La. 902, 60 So. 2d 867 (1952).
14. The actual provision of the challenged ordinance, adopted on Feb-
ruary 8, 1949, is as follows: "Section 1. . . . In no case shall intoxicating
liquor be sold on any premise zoned 'D-2' Neighborhood Commercial Dis-
trict, provided, however, that in the 'D-2' Neighborhood Commercial Dis-
trict the lawful sale of liquor allowed one year prior to the time and
passage of Ordinance No. 28 of 1948 (adopted May 25, 1948) may be con-
tinued although such sale does not conform with the provisions hereof,
and such sale of liquor may be continued unless and until this use (sale
of liquor) of the property is discontinued for a period of 6 months. In the
event the sale of liquor is discontinued for a period of 6 months, no further
license may be issued for the sale of liquor at such locations in the 'D-2'
Neighborhood Commercial District."
Hence it follows that the monopolistic "grandfather clause" of the ordi-
nance actually reached back over a period of more than 20 months. Plain-
tiff had in fact been operating his place of business (a drug store) for three
years, and had not obtained a license to sell liquor until November 26,




tive bodies. It is only when the criteria of classification have
no reasonable or rational relation to the object of the regula-
tory enactment that the legislation may be said to be invalid.
Or, to state the proposition affirmatively, classification which
is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious constitutes a
denial of equal protection of the laws.
There was no naive disregard for this settled principle
by the court in the instant case, but there is room for wide
difference of opinion over the manner in which the principle
was applied. In this case the legislative body had obviously
concluded that the public interest in the effective regulation
of liquor dictated that no further licenses be issued in the
"neighborhood commercial" zones of Shreveport. Admittedly
this action constituted discrimination in favor of existing estab-
lishments. But in view of the special nature of the liquor
traffic and its attendant problems which subject it to detailed
regulation, discrimination of this precise type has been sustained
in practically all jurisdictions which have encountered the issue.15
It has been the settled jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of the United States since 1890 that regulation of the sale of
liquor which discriminates in favor of existing establishments
does not offend the equal protection clause; 16 and in reaching
that result the Court distinguished its decision in the famous
case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins17 (cited and relied upon by the
Louisiana court in the instant case) upon the ground that the
business there regulated (laundries) was "a business harmless
in itself and useful to the community ... [whereas] In the pres-
ent case the business is not one that any person is permitted
to carry on without a license, but one that may be entirely
prohibited or subjected to such restrictions as the governing
authority of the city may prescribe."' 8
Prior Louisiana jurisprudence on the point, while not free
from doubt, would seem to have pointed to a different conclu-
sion in the subject case as well. In the 1906 decision of New
Orleans v. Smythe9 the actual point decided was that in the
course of regulating the selling of liquor New Orleans had not
infringed the equal protection clause by discriminating in favor
15. See annotation in 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722 (1907).
16. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
17. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18. 137 U.S. 86, 94 (1890).
19. 116 La. 685, 41 So. 33 (1906).
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of persons previously engaged in the traffic at the time of the
adoption of the ordinance. The Smythe case and its contempo-




Six of the cases decided by the court at last term involved
significant applications of rules governing enactment and inter-
pretation of legislation.1 These cases fell into two groups: the
first, consisting of two cases, posed the problem of the Legisla-
ture's disregard for its own rules of procedure, while the second
group, consisting of four cases, presented the always trouble-
some question of the latest expression of legislative will.
State v. Lawrence2 and State v. Gray3 were criminal prose-
cutions in which the defendants were charged with violating
the provisions of the state's Uniform Narcotics Drug Law4 as
amended by Act 30, First Extra Session of 1951. In both cases
the defendants contended that the amendatory act was invalid
for non-compliance by the Senate with the state constitutional
requirement that "no bill shall be considered for final passage
unless it . . . has been reported on by a committee."5 The un-
disputed facts showed, however, that the bill subsequently
emerging as the act in question had been favorably reported
by the Senate's Committee on Finance and that would seem
to have foreclosed the defense which was urged. But the
defendants in both cases argued that the constitutional require-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. There were, of course, numerous other cases involving settled prin-
ciples of statutory construction arising in substantive fields of the law.
Many of these cases are dealt with elsewhere in this Symposium. See, e.g.,
Mataya v. Delta Life Insurance Company, 222 La. 509, 62 So. 2d 817 (1953)
which is discussed under the Insurance title, infra p. 167.
In the case of State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So. 2d 897 (1952) the
court held that the savings clause of an act repealing a local option statute
served to continue in existence and effect any ordinance adopted prior to
local option laws. This subject is discussed in symposium, The Work of
the Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 125-
127 (1952).
2. 221 La. 861, 60 So. 2d 464 (1952).
3. 221 La. 868, 60 So. 2d 466 (1952).
4. La. R.S. 1950, 40:961 et seq.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 24.
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